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Perfect planning or the lack of effective lobbying?  






The EU has great medium term goals according to the common energy market. Its 
aim is to create a competition based productive, competitive gas market with respect to 
environmental aspects as well. Our aim is to examine with all of our restrictions, what (may) 
happen on this special field of energy market, closer on the gas market, by all the changes 
made within the framework of EU directed liberalization.  
More precisely, the aim of this study is to find out whether it is possible to handle the 
EU as a unity and to create one energy policy for the 27 Member States? Using more than a 
dozen of indicators chosen mainly from OECD studies and national statistics of countries we 
would like to classify EU Member States into some possibly homogeneous groups. We try to 
find out, whether it is possible to make some homogeneous clusters, or there may be some 
Member States left, as outsiders, which do not produce the expected conditions for example 
in state control, public ownership, entry regulation, and so on? We try to answer on the 
question why the common energy policy is so sensitive topic, and why a common energy 
policy cannot really be created without its full perception by Member States? By the help of 
this research we would like to get closer to answering our basic question, which refers to 
that, whether it is possible to extract a real EU level competition by liberalization in a 
market that has so different characteristics among member countries?  
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1. Background of the research – European gas market liberalisation 
If we look at the history of energy use, energy efficiency and its developments we 
can notice that the progress is intensifying and happening more and more rapidly by 
time passing. So what future will bring? Will we be burning fossil fuels, or will we 
use solar energy gathered high up in the atmosphere and beamed to us in the form of 
microwave radiation? The only reliable answer is that no one knows what will 
happen. Until someone will be able to answer these questions the participants, 
producers, suppliers and end users must adapt and adjust themselves to the actual 
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circumstances. This is the reason why the EU has “only” medium term real goals 
considering its common energy market. It’s several times published and emphasized 
aim to create a competition based productive, competitive gas market with respect to 
environmental aspects as well.  
1.1. Economic reasons  
Gas market liberalisation and the competition should solve all the problems of 
public supply in theory. Widely emphasized and accepted arguments are the 
widening possibility of choices, and the improved quality services on lower prices by 
the help of competition of suppliers. On the contrary the public property stands, 
which is often used as synonym of corruption and worsening quality. In reality we 
have to collect and add some more information and economic reasons in order to be 
able to decide which way is better to choose. 
Among the upper mentioned economic reasons the first must be the reason of 
competitiveness. This criterion can be found both at micro – company or sectoral 
level – and of course macro – Member States and EU-wide – levels as well. This is 
not the place where we would like to decide which is more important. We must add 
that according to the theory of industrial organisations energy supply as a public 
service provided by a sector that is influenced by a natural monopoly seems to be 
inconsistent with the conditions of competitiveness. As a solution for this situation 
the EU does not expect Member States to “sell out” public properties, but to improve 
the market structure, at least by a separation.  
In many Member States, where regulators decided to reorganise the originally 
monopolistic structure of gas sector, private investors have “great expectations” to 
gain higher profitability. The higher are these expectations are the bigger should be 
the innovation constraint. This pressure appears not only from the investors side, but 
from the fact that public services – be it energy services, telecommunication or 
water supply – are usually in bad conditions (Scheiring – Boda 2008). 
Among economic reasons the following could be that these structures and 
services should or expected to be run efficiently and in a competitive spirit. A widely 
accepted solution is that a network could be more effective if competition is being 
created or let on at least some levels of the network, if not in the whole structure. 
The question is now changing, since we have to decide somehow that those 
structures seem to function “better” where market based competition characteristics 
appear or those where still natural monopolies dominate (Bakács 2003)? 
1.2. EU policy reasons  
It is easy to understand that with economic reasons mentioned in the previous 
paragraph the European Union must face and adapt itself to the present challenges 
and circumstances like the problems in the security of supply, higher gas prices, 
climate change and try to exploit as much from the market by the help of 
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liberalization and so competition as it can. Europe must go back to its roots and 
original aims to have a common answer on these problems which affect almost 
every Member States. Sustainability, security and competitiveness are not the ones 
which could be reached by single Member States themselves. Along with some other 
not less important goals the creation of a common energy strategy was also a central 
element of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and also of the European 
Atomic Energy Community (1957) (COM(2007) 1). Although conditions have 
changed a lot in the last more than 50 years, common answer, namely the creation of 
a common European gas market is more necessary and important than ever.  
Unfortunately or not, the European Union seems to be a bit poor considering 
the reach of these acceptable goals. Although the beneficial effects of an integrated 
and common answer are all known and stressed regularly by the Commission and by 
scholars of energy policy “Today’s Union is still without what could be called 
Common Energy Policy.” (Pointvogl 2009, pp. 1) The European government has 
still tools only mainly in the sub- or co-areas of energy like environment, research, 
infrastructure and lately competition and Single Market. There can be several 
reasons lying behind the processes. The supranational level regulation’s fate is 
sealed by the fact that until the 70-ies public services were not being regulated at 
Community level. Moreover, the EU has the right to regulate this field only by 
directives. The problem of using directives in regulating such a sensitive and 
strategically important sector of Member States is serious. Directives are said to be 
less effective in reaching goals compared to regulations, but unfortunately they are 
the most applicable tools in fields where Member States want to maintain some 
licenses and possibility of intervention.  
Although they have adopted several directives in the field of common energy 
market, it does not seem to be enough to reach the EU’s mid-term goals. The 
Council of the European Union has accepted the first two directives for the 
electricity (96/92/EC) and the gas market (98/30/EC) quite late. Later on because of 
ineffectiveness in decreasing monopolies’ dominancy and unifying fragmented 
market two other directives replaced them in 2003 of which the more important from 
our point of view is the 2003/55/EC. Although development has started and there are 
positive effects of the liberalisation process, still not every advantages are being 
exploited in the market (COM(2009) 115). In the meantime Services Directive 
(2006/123/EC) became adopted in 2006, but it does not contain the complete 
regulation of services of general interest. The third package of measures must have 
been adopted because of the failure of the previous two attempts. The third package 
– with a report called “An energy policy for Europe” (COM(2007) 1) as a starting 
point – adopted by the Commission plans to ensure that all European citizens can 
take advantage of the numerous benefits provided by a truly competitive energy 
market. Consumer choice, fairer prices, cleaner energy and security of supply are at 




September 2007. We have to add not only by the way, that the directive plans to 
decrease market concentration and the cutting up of giant vertically and both 
horizontally integrated energy providers in order to create symmetric and 
harmonized energy market. These steps seem to be necessary because of the above 
mentioned report published in 2007, which reflected highly concentrated market 
structure concerned state or regional levels, by which incumbent actors with the lack 
of effective liberalisation and competition are still able to control import/production, 
access of networks and maybe prices as well. We have to add that the success of 
these directives is highly influenced by the attitude of Member States and interested 
companies of the energy sector. The present state of legislation in the Member States 
will come up later. 
1.3. Problems 
Going ahead introducing the reasons of necessary gas market liberalisation we 
have to mention shortly the problems, of which solution seems to be only the 
creation of a really competitive and competition based market structure.  
We all know that liberalisation does not mean deregulation but rather re-
regulation in the sense that new regulations are needed in order to create the 
expected structure and competition. This is true in a greater extent for the market of 
public services. The most important reason for the liberalisation is that the state 
seems to be inefficient in providing these services. But we cannot forget that these 
markets seem to be so special that they need special handling as well. By the help of 
new regulation market failures like monopolies or abuse of dominant position can be 
handled and new coming actors can face better conditions than ever in order to be 
enough competitive compared to their incumbent competitors. Reduction of so 
called market entry barriers is the main task of decision makers, authorities, and of 
actors in order to let new comers entering the market. These barriers of market entry 
can be divided into three main groups. The group of natural barriers (1), covers 
mostly physical market access problems, and so delivery costs; the group of 
artificial/administrative barriers (2) of market entry means mostly active trade 
policy and some structural barriers that can come from the specific industry we are 
talking about. As we all know that the distances – because of decreasing transport 
costs – became less and less, and the EU, the WTO and so almost every countries of 
the world are somehow committed promoting liberal trade policies and towards the 
reduction of trade barriers, the first two groups of market entry barriers have less and 
less importance in reaching different markets. The rest of the conditions that may 
restrict trade can be mentioned as strategic market entry barriers (3). The 
importance of these latest mentioned barriers has increased along by the decreased 
importance of the first two groups (Török 2003). Their common characteristic is that 
they can be somehow related to strategic behaviour of actors of a market and so 
usually “only” national competition authorities and/or the Commission of the 
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European Union (DG Competition) deals with them. The problem that lies beneath 
this phenomena is that whether national governments on a sensitive field like the 
EU’s common gas market accept their loose of control with resignation or they use 
their toolbar of competition regulation in order to maintain their influence. If they 
feel like it is necessary to hold this licence in their hand that will necessarily mean 
stronger resistance to every EU-level attempt that tries to liberalise the market and 
will appear as a legal barrier later. 
Second type of problems in our opinion can be considered more important 
because in some aspects it is somewhat independent in short and medium-terms 
from every attempts and plans made by governments or by the EU itself. That is 
why security of supply of energy2 – by acceptable reasons – has become one of the 
most popular keywords of political and economic debates. It is getting considered as 
the Holy Grail of common energy policy (Weisser 2007, Jamasb – Pollitt 2008). The 
Commission’s Green Paper (COM(2000) 769) about European strategy for the 
security of energy supply drew attention to the worrying and growing level of 
dependence – it may reach 70 percentage by 2020 – on gas imports from sources 
outside the EU. The task of organising security of supply cannot be entrusted to just 
one player of the market. Member States are obliged to define the roles and 
responsibilities of all the players on the market with regard to security of supply 
(2004/67/EC). As it can be seen from the footnote definition security of supply has 
different sides and so different objectives to reach. One European-level measure that 
may improve security of supply would be the resolution of the above mentioned 
problem, namely the removal of barriers of supply-side competition and so creation 
of closer cross-border cooperation and interoperability of gas systems. From an 
infrastructural side further trade and investments within the internal gas market as 
well as interlinking of networks play a fundamental role in the flexibility of supplies. 
With these measures we could improve gas trade among Member States. Another 
measure that needs common answer but does not remain within the borders is the 
reduction of dependency from a single supplier. In this research further on we plan 
to map only present possibilities and not the future ones. 
Both two above mentioned problems are so serious, complex and 
interconnected, that require common answer from the part of the EU. A problem or 
difficulty coming from this fact is only that whether Member States are willing to 
renounce their licenses in favour of a common policy. Without such a cooperative 
behaviour common energy policy seems to be impossible to create! 
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2. Research – the analysis of participants of European gas market 
liberalisation 
Our research is based on an assumption – made by previous experiences and 
by the reactions and answers given on the upper mentioned problems – that there are 
huge differences among EU Member States considering for example their gas 
market structure, the level of state intervention, the security of supply, the sources of 
energy and some other important factors. So our research is based on a somehow 
theoretical identification of the conditions in which there can be differences existing, 
and so defining different groups, parties among Member States.  
The reason of our choice is based on the basic differences between the gas and 
the electricity sector. Although they are highly bounded and related to each other, 
we have to distinguish them. Meanwhile electricity is a produced good and every 
Member State and even households could be able to generate it by traditional tools, 
or using the “greenest”, recently supported resources, natural gas is a type of energy 
that can be found in only one half of the Member States but far not in an enough 
amount neither related to their present nor to their future demand.  
Our other reason for the object of our research is that what is presented in the 
study of Brekke et al (2008). They examined the net welfare effects of the 
liberalisation process both in the electricity and in the gas sector and found that the 
positive effects of liberalising domestic gas markets are much smaller compared to 
the other sector.  
2.1. Basic assumptions 
The idea that Member States are not in the same position to give the same 
answers and follow the same methods is quite old. It can be originated from the 
Tindemans-report (1976), but nowadays it is more actual than ever. We could hear it 
in connection with the Constitution of Europe, but also related to the Economic and 
Monetary Union, connected to general economic policy and the economic crises, 
EU-level institutional organization or in general in debates over the future of the 
European Union (Csaba 2006, Marján 2007).  
This made us think over this phenomenon in connection with one special and 
sensitive market, the gas market. There are several reasons lying beneath the 
reaction of countries. We will now focus on those which can be basis of an objective 
measuring and try to exclude those which are coming from the sensitiveness of the 
sector.  
There are three studies or researches which lead us on our way to define our 
questions, create the factors and summarize our results. First tool was the so called 
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Railway Liberalisation-index of IBM from 20043. As a reason of the study, we have 
to mention that similarly to the gas sector, one of the main objectives of the 
European Union is the integration of national rail markets into a harmonized 
domestic European rail transport market. In view of this goal, the coexistence of de 
facto closed and open national rail markets was and is unacceptable. The main is to 
analyze how open the rail sector is to new competitors. For this reason, when 
analyzing the markets, the LIB Index4 concentrated on the point of view of external 
railway undertakings (IBM 2007).  
The second instrument dealing with market differences in a specific sector is 
closer to our topic. The Energy Policy Index (EPI) created by Röller et al. (2007) 
became published by Bruegel in the Energy: Choices for Europe. They have 
investigated the status quo of Europe’s energy policy – both gas and electricity(!) 
markets –, in terms of the three energy policy objectives: competitiveness, security 
of supply and environmental sustainability. In order to get a comparable measure 
across Member States, they have constructed the above mentioned indicator which 
gives a position of each country in relation to each of the objectives. On the basis of 
the Energy Policy Index, they made a cluster analysis, by which they could group 
countries according to the three objectives. From this analysis they also noticed that 
national starting-points vary considerably.  
The third analysis made by Pointvogl (2009) was based on a research focusing 
on the driving forces of the integration and on the differences revealed among 
member states of European energy policies, with the title “Perceptions, realities, 
concession”.  
Not exactly assumptions, but many ideas and data came from the Ten years of 
product market reform in OECD countries – insights from a revised PMR indicator 
OECD Working Papers written by Wölfl et al. in 2009 and some previous ones like 
the work of Conway - Nicoletti (2006). We could obtain many ideas and influences 
creating the factors based on their approach.  
2.2. Objectives  
By the help of the above mentioned studies we tried to focus exactly on the 
gas market of the EU Member States. We could create three groups where the 
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action) encountered in practice as well as the percentage of accessible domestic market. A separate 




answers of a Member State for different challenges may be interesting and 
determining in our opinion. This research is intended to be an exploratory analysis, 
focusing on those dimensions and factors that determine member states’ approaches 
towards integration, and their sometimes contrasting view.  
As a first group we planned to examine the conditions and the circumstances 
that determine security of supply (SoS) (1). In our opinion these are indicators that 
can be changed only in longer term, and so we can consider them constant in a short-
time period. Examination of different vertical levels and market structure of the gas 
sector (2) is the second group that contains some information about 
production/import, transmission/distribution and providing service towards 
consumers. As we think, these conditions can be changed in medium term. Finally 
the examination of government involvement (3) contains important facts about the 
actual position of a market. These conditions can be mentioned as legal market entry 
barriers which are almost related only to government decisions and interests.  
2.3. Sources of data  
We agree with Pointvogl (2009) and know that the gap between the trinity of 
the EU’s policy goals – competitiveness, security of supply and environmental 
sustainability – and the strategic behaviour of involved players – governments, 
companies, authorities – risk the success of a deep and updated analysis of gas 
market in itself. This is further more complicated in a period when member states 
are in their integration process.  
Our work is theoretical as we have already mentioned, because we are 
convinced that it could function in practice if all the relevant information were 
published and publicly accessible at the same time. Unfortunately we have met 
many difficulties in collecting relevant data. We missed many updated information 
related to present state of different markets. We also met the problem of higher level 
data protection in connection with such a strategic sector and activity of countries or 
companies. Unfortunately competition authorities are also missing some relevant 
information referring to market shares that would be useful for them in investigating 
horizontal and vertical cartels in the sector.  
Significant amount of the information we could collect from OECD Working 
Paper 36 (Wölfl et al. 2009), and from a DG TREN Staff Working Document 
(SEC(2009) 287) and information that refers to constant data like consumption and 
dependency we could find in Energy Pocket Book (CEC 2009). Unfortunately there 
were still important data missing, so we used Internal Market Fact Sheets of the 
Member States, Network Country factsheets of International Energy Regulation, the 
statistical basis of International Energy Agency and of Statistisches Bundesamt 
Deutschland if needed. 
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As we have collected and – in case of missing ones – calculated all data we 
considered being important for a brief analysis of the gas sector, we had to decide 
the method of the comparison and of the grouping of Member States to reveal the 
differences and the similarities among them. In order to be able to perform the 
chosen method, cluster analysis we were forced to create the factors that constitute 
the basis of the comparison.  
3.1. The variables 
For the performance of a successful cluster analysis we had to collect those data, 
which tell us the most accessible information we could ever get. We have collected 
several, here not represented information considering the gas markets of the EU, but 
we have faced the problem of missing information so many times, that we had to 
reduce the number of factors used in the analysis. Finally – as Table 1 shows it – we 
have chosen those where the information were the most reliable and the most 
comprehensive. Having seen the remained variables, we created three groups of 
them; one refers to the basic conditions a country can face, other deals only with the 
structure of the market, and the third group of variables will give us information 
about the government involvement and the legal barriers of market entry. We have 
to add that we agree with Jamasb - Pollitt (2008) and Pointvogl (2009) who stress 
that variables though being exogenous are not absolutely independent from each 
other and from influences.  
3.1.1. Conditions 
 
This first group of variables cover mostly our first objective, namely to reveal 
and stress the differences in the basic circumstances if they exist at all. We consider 
these conditions important, because there are some which cannot be basis of a 
change in short terms, but these are almost the only ones determining security of 
supply5.  
So our first variable among this group is Total energy consumption per capita 
(it is measured in kg or equivalent per person). Our second, but maybe more 
important indicator is Gas Import dependency. It is given in percentage and getting 
calculated as Net Imports is being divided by the sum of Bunkers and Gross Inland 
Consumption. The third content of the first group of variables is Diversity. In our 
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significant decrease could be measured in gas consumption when gas price increased in the middle of 
2006. That shows a slight consciousness from the part of the population, and the earlier useless(?) 




opinion this is also an important indicator, since it shows the number of possible 
sources covering import necessity. A country’s one-sided energy defencelessness 
could hold many problems in the supply side, as we have seen it two or three times 
now in connection with Europe’s high dependency from Russian sources. As Jamasb 
and Pollitt stress it, “The most commonly suggested remedy for increasing security 
of supply is diversification, to reduce overdependence on individual countries or 
regions, and on particular types of supply.” (Jamasb – Pollitt 2008, pp. 4585). In a 
way we could make further difference in the exact meaning of the word diversity. 
According to the cited sentence it may contain also various types of energy sources, 
so maybe Weisser’s word “optionality” – the degree of viable alternative options – 
represents our intents better (Weisser 2007). 
Our present research does not contain it, but in the future we think that 
measuring and comparing Storage capacity can be also useful in getting a clear 
picture of the market conditions.  
3.1.2. Market structure  
 
Within the second group of variables we have collected indicators which give us 
information about both the market share of the largest company in the gas 
production/import, the gas transmission and the gas supply industry.  
With the first indicator – Market structure – we could get a quite broad view 
about the whole market, but we have collected further information as a control for 
each sub-market. The variable of Number of companies with over 5% share of 
production/import capacity, the Share of 3 biggest companies (by available gas) (%) 
and the Share of 3 largest wholesalers in wholesale market (%) give us information 
about the structure of gas import and production. The last three indicators – Number 
of independent suppliers, Companies with market share over 5% and Market share 
of 3 largest companies in whole retail market (%) – show the structure of gas retail 
market. Unfortunately most of the necessary estimations were made within these 
data.  
3.1.3. Barriers to competition  
 
As we have mentioned it above this group of indicators hold information 
mainly about the existence of legal barriers and about the level of government 
involvement in the different levels of the sector.  
Scope of public enterprise sector contains information on the fact whether 
national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in gas sector (gas 
production/import or gas transmission or gas distribution or gas supply). 
Government involvement in network sector reveals the percentage of shares owned 
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by government in the largest firm in the gas production/import, or gas transmission 
or gas distribution or gas supply sector. The existence of price controls gives us 
information about the practice of regulated tariffs in case of industrial users, small 
commercial users or households. We consider this variable to be important since 
price control represents one of the most common instruments for the regulation of 
public services (Dorigoni – Portatadino 2009). Legal Barriers to entry discovers 
those national, state or provincial laws or other regulations that may restrict the 
number of competitors allowed to operate a business in at least some markets in gas 
sector. Antitrust exemptions for public enterprises or state-mandated actions 
contains the information about existing rule or principle providing for exclusion or 
exemption from liability under the general competition law for conduct that is 
required or authorized by other government authority (in addition to exclusions that 
might apply to complete sectors). Entry regulation in Gas industry is a composite 
index of relevant information. It contains answer on the question how are the terms 
and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the gas transmission grid determined 
(1), what percentage of the retail market is open to consumer choice (2), and about 
whether national, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number of 
competitors allowed to operate a business in at least some markets in the sector: gas 
production/import (3). The information about the proportion of market open to 
competition also belongs to this group of questions, but refers to the entire sector. 
Vertical integration in gas industry is also a composite index, that contains answers 
for three questions referring to the question of the degree of vertical separation 
between gas production/import and the other segments of the industry (1), the degree 
of vertical separation between gas supply and the other segments of the industry (2) 





Table 1. Summarizing list containing the three groups of variables used in the 
research 
Variables of Conditions Variables of Market structure Variables of Barriers to 
Competition 
Total energy consumption per 
capita 
Market structure Scope of public enterprise 
sector 
Gas Import dependency Number of companies with 
over 5% share of 
production/import capacity 
Government involvement in 
network sector 
Diversity/optionality Share of 3 biggest companies 
(by available gas) (%) 
Existence of price controls 
 Share of 3 largest wholesalers 
in wholesale market (%) 
Legal Barriers to entry 
 Number of independent 
suppliers 
Antitrust exemptions for public 
enterprises or state-mandated 
actions 
 Companies with market share 
over 5% 
Entry regulation in Gas industry 
 Market share of 3 largest 
companies in whole retail 
market (%) 
Proportion of market open to 
competition 
  Vertical integration in gas 
industry 
Source: own creation 
3.2. Cluster analysis  
In order to find out whether countries can be grouped according to their conditions 
and characteristics, we perform a cluster analysis by the help of the huge amount of 
standardised data. It is important to stress that the groupings which came out of the 
analysis are rather indicative and, of course, could be subject of further qualitative 
assessment of the data gathered from several sources.  
Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis technique which attempts to 
identify natural groupings (clusters). We performed a hierarchical cluster analysis 
using the data of 23 Member States for creating natural groupings. Only 23 
countries’ data is involved. Because of the missing updated information we had to 
use data from 2006 until 2008. Almost every statistics from this period missed 
Romania and Bulgaria as new Member States. The explanation of the other two 
“missing” countries is more trivial. Because of climatic conditions and geographical 
background Cyprus and Malta simply do not use gas as energy (EUROSTAT 2009).  
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4. Results of the research 
In order to find out whether countries can be grouped according to their 
conditions and characteristics, we perform a cluster analysis by the help of the huge 
amount of standardised data. It is important to stress that the groupings which came 
out of the analysis are rather indicative and, of course, could be subject of further 
qualitative assessment of the data gathered from several sources.  
Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis technique which attempts to 
identify natural groupings (clusters). We performed a hierarchical cluster analysis 
using the data of 23 Member States for creating natural groupings. Only 23 
countries’ data is involved. Because of the missing updated information we had to 
use data from 2006 until 2008. Almost every statistics from this period missed 
Romania and Bulgaria as new Member States. The explanation of the other two 
“missing” countries is more trivial. Because of climatic conditions and geographical 
background Cyprus and Malta simply do not use gas as energy (EUROSTAT 2009).  
4.1. The five clusters 
On the basis of the collected data and relevant information and using hierarchical 
cluster analysis with Ward methods, we could classify Member States into five 
groups. The identification of the number of clusters was based on the coefficients of 
Agglomeration Schedule.  
 
4.1.1. A “unique group”  
 
We start our examination with the end of the results. We have chosen a 5 clustered 
outcome because we knew that there may be some potential states that can be unique 
in some senses. By this way the first group contains only Latvia.  
It is easy to understand the result if we see the characteristics of this country. 
Small population with high energy consumption, which is combined with high 
import dependency (108.8%) which is covered from Russian sources only. It has a 
small concentrated market with a vertically integrated state owned company, which 
means high level of government involvement. As a summary in our point of view we 
could say that the Latvian gas sector is not considered to be mature in the sense of 
liberalisation, competition and development.  
 
4.1.2. Group of states that need further development  
 
The characteristics of “Group 2” that consists of Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Luxembourg and Sweden are quite low energy consumption, with an 




consumption. With the rate of 82.2% gas import dependency proved to be the lowest 
in Hungary. Although the average level of government involvement seems to be 
lower than in other groups, compared to other clusters’ members, the overall market 
structure is not “developed” enough in the sense of level of competition. So 
concentrated market structure, medium level government involvement and vertical 
integration are combined with weak diversity position (except in Luxembourg).  
4.1.3. Group of “country-mix”  
 
For us, this third group is quite surprising since the members vary, and being so in 
general no one would put them together in one “party” in a debate over common 
energy policy. “Group 3” contains: Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
As we have mentioned the characteristics of this group are varying somehow. 
For example in case of Total energy consumption we can find the lowest in Poland 
(2429 kgoe per person) and the highest in Belgium (5891.7 kgoe per person). Gas 
import dependency is the lowest again in Poland (around 71.9%) and the highest in 
Spain (101.3%). Only Ireland and Lithuania are the two countries of this group who 
can cover their natural gas demand from one source according to our data. The 
lowest level of government involvement we can find in Spain, meanwhile Ireland 
maintains the highest level of it that is also combined with the highest vertical 
integration in gas industry among the members of the group. Compared to the 
previous group they seem to be in better position because of their market structure.  
 
4.1.4. Group of “good basics”  
 
The fourth group consists of only Denmark and the Netherlands. Their medium level 
energy consumption is combined with low dependency, since they belong to that 
minority within the EU who have significant domestic resources considering natural 
gas. From the number of players being active in each level of the sector we can see 
that competition already exists, although government involvement is not the lowest 
compared to other clusters. Their market structure seems to be competitive, 
liberalised and so developed. From some aspects United Kingdom could also belong 
to this group, since it represents quite the same characteristics.  
 
4.1.5. Group of “developed” nations 
 
The last but not least group became the triad of Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. They perform medium level energy consumption, around 90 percentage 
energy dependency (except the UK with its 11.8%), already competitive market 
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structure, and liberalised market with the highest number of independent companies 
in the supply side, and with higher government involvement only in Italy.  
Although we can find differences among them, there are some common 
interests lying behind in case of large countries, or countries with relatively low – 
compared to other groups – foreign dependency. They might not derive significant 
benefits from giving a European dimension to their external policy (Röller et al 
2007). Albeit within these countries almost everybody can mention at least one so 
called national champion to which companies’ high level of national interests and 
emotion belongs, these are the countries that represent good performance if we 
measure development through liberalisation process and competitive state of the 
sector.  
4.2. Positions of Member States related to each other 
Multidimensional scaling gives the geometrical representation of our objects in a 
lower dimension but with the maintenance of the order and of original distances. 
Considering the goodness of fit S-stress will give the basis of the success and the 
possibility of interpretation of the outputs6.  
One dimensional scaling technique will provide the possibility of the creation 
of a rank of development if S-stress less then .2 and the dimension is definable. The 
value of S-stress of the examination is 0.12227, that can be considered good, so the 
model of the reduced number of dimensions seems to hold every relevant 
information. According to correlation between and the indicators providing the basis 
of MDS, we have to define to dimension.  From Table 2, we can see the significant 
correlations between mds1 and those variables that seemed to be significant from the 
point of our research.  
                                                     
6 Results of the MDS are considered to be good if S-stress shows a value lower than 0.1. If the value is 
between 0.1 and 0.2 the results could be acceptable, meanwhile in case of a value higher than 0.2 the 




Table 2. Correlations among those variables that seemed to be significant from the 
point of the research 
 mds1 
Total energy Consumption (per capita) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
.623(**) 
.001 
Gas Import dependency (in %) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.552(**) 
.006 
Diversity: number of possible sources covering import 
necessity 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
.548(**) 
.007 
Market Structure Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.822(**) 
.000 
Number of companies with over 5% share of 
production/import capacity in 2007 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
.852(**) 
.000 
Share of 3 biggest companies (by available gas) (%) in 
2007 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.675(**) 
.000 
Market share of 3 largest companies in whole retail 
market (%) 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.496(*) 
.016 
Government involvement in network sector Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.418(*) 
.047 
Proportion of market open to competition (2007) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
.581(**) 
.004 
Vertical integration in gas industry Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
-.535(**) 
.008 
Source: own creation 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed) 
 
As we can see bigger part of the variables determine the mds1. Analysing 
these correlations, we can point out that the dimension mds1 could really be 
considered as an indicator of development, by which we can determine the order of 
Member States’ by the state of their gas markets. We must handle these results 
carefully since the country represented with twice bigger MDS coordinates does not 
mean two times more developed country on the scale of gas market maturity. So for 
getting the exact positions every Member States shall get a rank number (Figure 1). 
If two countries’ MDS coordinates seem to represent the same value, we have to 
apply the mean rank. 
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Figure 1. Ranking of Member States according to the maturity of their gas sector 
 
 
Source: own creation 
 
We think that state of development is somehow related to the three stages of 
evolution of gas markets detailed by Austvik (2009). According to our expectations 
the ranking is led by the United Kingdom, who is often mentioned as one – beside 
the non-EU member USA – of the good examples considering energy market 
liberalisation. Those countries follow it where “The monopolistic position of the 
transmission companies becomes less predominant, and market transactions are 
more diversified. Producers and customers have to a degree more purchasers to 
choose from (gas-to-gas competition). At the same time, however, companies start 
integrating horizontally (with competing firms) and vertically (with firms further up 
or down in the gas chain) by mergers and acquisitions, which may contribute to 
higher concentration around the large champions, if allowed by competition 




sense that there is some competition with alternative sources, routes of transport, and 
where competition within the market appears to lead the ranking of our research.  
The order is being closed by Latvia and those countries where there is a need 
for investments both upstream and downstream to improve competition at markets. 
In case of countries from the second half (like Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, etc.) with low domestic resources and few 
possible sources covering their high import dependency, concentrated market 
structure, medium level government involvement and vertical integration are 
combined with weak diversity position. They might see the creation of domestic 
competition as a danger to their security of supply (Röller et al. 2007). Some small 
central European and Baltic countries could find themselves in a weaker position 
when negotiating with foreign upstream suppliers, and might be more eager to face 
such negotiations under a protective European umbrella. 
The groups represented with different shapes in Figure 1 could provide the 
basis of understanding the differences among the cooperative behaviour in energy 
policies and reactions on common energy policy of the Member States. By the help 
of this indicative result we can focus on special characteristics and demands of 
countries with different energy conditions. We have to add that we consider the 
result only indicative that could be subject of further examination, since many things 
and conditions on this market changed during the last 2-3 years and are changing 
nowadays as well. The study must be updated regularly in order to get precise basis 
for the creation of an effective and workable policy. 
5. Conclusions 
Our aim, as we have mentioned it previously, was to reveal the differences among 
Member States if they exist at all. Our second objective was to find a possible 
classification to see the possible perceptions, common perspectives and negotiating 
positions of countries that are close to each other not geographically but in their gas 
market characteristics. We found this important because the debate on a common 
European energy policy cannot simply ignore the current situation of each Member 
State.  
In fact we agree with Röller et al. (2007) that countries might find conflicts in 
pursuing all three energy policy objectives – competitiveness, security of supply and 
environmental sustainability – at the same time and at least in the short term, might 
be confronted with a number of trade-offs in favour of each, on each fields of energy 
sector. Although our examination concentrated only to the first objective, we can see 
from the results that policies designed to increase efficiency, secure supply and 
protect the environment might not necessarily be complementary, driven and 
fulfilled together at the same time. Increasing the strength of one might require 
relaxing the pursuit of other objectives. 
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As a result, we have found that there are significant differences among the 
state of development of Member States’ gas sectors, considering their basic 
circumstances and the strength of market players – independent companies or 
governments – as well. At this point we agree with the statement of Pointvogl (2009) 
who found that the perception of Member States drives the integration of European 
energy policies. We think that this perception is highly determined by their state of 
development considering each sub-sectors of the energy industry. Our intention was 
to reveal these differences in especially the gas sector.  
The conflict of deciding about the order of meeting the objectives is further 
more increased by the liberalisation “push” from the part of the EU. In many 
Member States this requirement faces old industrial model with high amount and 
vide range of market entry barriers, and with high level of dependency towards 
foreign countries. We join to the opinion of Vissi (2006) and Kaderják (2009) who 
say that the conditions of competition of general interest are unfortunately missing 
both at wholesale and retail level of the market in several Central and Eastern 
European countries or telling the truth in countries with low-level of diversity who 
are represented in almost every groups. Until the number of the input possibilities – 
as we have mentioned the level of diversity or optionality – will not increase, real 
competition and so competitive market is impossible to be obtained by any kind of 
force.  
Our last but not least question is that does it make sense and is it possible 
liberalising on a market with such different conditions? The diversity of the input 
and the size and dynamism of wholesale market decides whether there is enough 
choice and prices competition possibility on a market. We risk asking that whether it 
makes sense liberalising until in many Member States dependency is so high and 
diversity of the input are so scarce?  
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